The New Chariho School Committee Should be Commended for Following the Law

By Joe Larisa, Esq.

January 3, 2025

At the December 17, 2024 Chariho School Committee meeting, the Superintendent attempted to bully the Committee majority into voting for a chairperson – not of their choosing – that very night in no uncertain terms. It was claimed that to not do so was a clear and willful violation of law – so clear that the Superintendent flatly stated that if the Committee did not vote for a Chair that night, they could be sued and that the district would not represent or indemnify them in the face of that lawsuit. This, despite the fact that the Superintendent works for the Committee, not the other way around, is not an attorney, and in any event, it is the Committee itself that determines legal representation and indemnification, not their employee.

Most importantly, as explained below, the so-called 10-day “deadline” had long since passed (undisclosed at the time) and as a matter of law there is no binding “deadline” mandating election of a chair or other officers “at the first meeting” exists at all. Here, there was a very good reason not to do so. Declining to appoint a Chair was (as stated at the meeting by the departing member) very much in the public interest so that the newest member of the Committee from Richmond (not the lame duck at her last meeting) could participate in the vote choosing leadership for the next two years.

The attempt to muscle through a premature vote was all part of an orchestrated effort to deny the newest member of the Committee – who was being appointed by the Richmond Town Council that same night, and was sworn in the day after the meeting – from running for Chair or Vice-Chair or any other office herself or participating in the vote. By law, the Chair must be one of the four Richmond members. Indeed, after the vote was tabled, the Town Council President herself publicly admitted that this was the plan – and doubled down by urging the Committee to wrongly exclude the newest Richmond member (now sworn in) from consideration as Chair at the next meeting on January 14th– and to instead choose one other 3 members from Richmond. This regardless of each member’s policy preference and First Amendment right (and indeed obligation) to their constituents to vote for the candidate they feel is the best person for the job.

In fact, the effect of the “must elect a Chair tonight” position is that somehow the law required an immediate majority vote for Chair for the next 2 years, even if that vote was against the wishes of a majority of members who would serve the next 2 years. Fortunately for democracy, the law here elevates the right of an elected official to vote their conscience over an  arbitrary, non-binding, deadline.

Noteworthy also is the fact that despite all the bluster at the first meeting about a lawsuit against the Committee and non-indemnification of members, there has been nothing but crickets. For the reasons below, no lawsuit has been filed, nor will a serious one ever be filed, claiming a violation of the timing provision for selection of officers contained in the Chariho Act.

The “10 day” provision cited by the Superintendent states that: “Within ten (10) days after the election and certification of the members of the regional school district committee, said regional school district committee shall meet and organize by selecting one (1) of their number to be chairperson of said committee.” Further, in the same section, it states that: “At such first meeting of the said committee following the election and qualification of new members, the Committee shall elect a chairperson and elect such other officers and [as] are herein or hereafter authorized and each two (2) years thereafter at such first meeting following a general election at which school committee members are elected, the regional school district committee shall organize and elect or appoint such officers.”

The latter provision would obligate not only the selection of a Chair at the first meeting, but also a vice-chair and “other officers [as] are herein or hereafter authorized.” While the Superintendent and Open Meeting Act complainants view this language as “mandatory,” the law clearly views it as “directory” only – especially here when it is undisputed that the officer votes were tabled for a laudable reason by the majority for one meeting until a new member (who was appointed that night and sworn in the next day) could exercise her substantial right to vote for leadership.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court just weighed in again on the issue of whether a timing provision in a State statue is “mandatory” or merely “directory.”

Like the word “shall,” the word “will” generally “contemplates something mandatory or the imposition of a duty * * *.” . . . However, “where the language of a statute is directed at public officers or where the Legislature does not provide a sanction for the failure to meet that requirement, the statute may be deemed directory so long as substantial rights of the parties are not prejudiced.” . . . “As such, ‘where the act is performed but not in the time or in the precise manner directed by the statute, the provision will not be considered mandatory if the purpose of the statute has been substantially complied with and no substantial rights have been jeopardized.’”

Bronhard v. Thayer St. Dist. Mgmt. Auth., 326 A.3d 178 (R.I. 2024) (cleaned up) (numerous citations omitted).

The Supreme Court “looks to a variety of factors when analyzing whether time provisions are directory or mandatory, including (1) the presence or absence of a sanction, (2) whether the provision is the essence of the statute, and (3) whether the provision is aimed at public officers.” Id. (quoting West, 18 A.3d at 534. The Chariho election provision clearly and easily meets all three of the Supreme Court’s requirements for a time provision that is not mandatory, but directory only.

First, the timing provision is applicable to Committee members who are public officers, not private citizens.

Second, there is no sanction for failure to comply with the statute. The Chair and officers if not chosen within 10 days, as here, or if not chosen after the first meeting, as here, can simply be chosen at the next meeting without any penalty for doing so contained in the statute.

Third, as the Court held in several cases, the timing issue here is a “‘provision related to a matter of procedure[,]’” and . . . the time constraint is not the essence of the statute.” Id. at 182 (citations omitted). The essence of the Chariho Act’s election provisions is to ensure governing continuity after each election. Here, the pre-election Vice-chair chaired the first meeting (which was already after the 10 day deadline) including the vote to table the election of a Chair and all officers until the next meeting. No business was halted and the Chair and all officers will presumably be elected at the next meeting. The Committee has and will continue to serve the district uninterrupted.

Thus, no substantial rights were affected by the postponement of a vote for a Chair and other officers for one meeting. In fact, by tabling the election of officers for a meeting, the rights of the new member to participate were preserved and the right of each elected Committee member to vote for the person they deem fit for Chair and each office was preserved.

Moreover, since there was no violation of the Chariho Act, as the Open Meetings Act complainants claim, and there was a simple deferment of the selection of a Chair until the next meting, the OMA complaints fail.

The Committee should be lauded for insisting on the preservation of important rights in the best interests of the communities they represent, and not castigated for choosing preservation of these rights over an non-mandatory time limit.